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Abstract 
Prioritizing on most critical weaknesses in a network system at the correct time is a very important role 
in network security administration. Due to the complexity and high unpredictability of exploitations it 
is hard to decide which vulnerabilities and which IP s are at the highest risk at a particular time. 
Present study proposes a new methodology that enables network administrators to rank vulnerabilities 
based on the probability of being exploited at a given time using the Markovian process. Markovian 
process allows us to iterate a transition probability matrix for a network system consisting identified or 
discovered vulnerabilities. This process result in a steady state with probabilities that a vulnerability 
will be exploited. Similar approach is used here to develop a risk rank model. Well known Google Page 
Rank Algorithm also uses a similar approach in estimating the probability of a web surfer reaching a 
particular webpage. Same concept can be used with several modifications to estimate and rank the risk 
level of each vulnerability in a network system. New methodology is presented with an example of a 
small network model with three vulnerabilities. 
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1. Introduction 
A Network systems could have numerous vulnerabilities. We understand the process of generating 
vulnerabilities is highly stochastic and outcomes are hard to predict. Similarly the behavior of attacks 
and attackers also have higher level unpredictability. When considering a particular system based on 
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the discovered vulnerabilities the analysis must consider the dynamic nature of the effect of 
vulnerabilities over time. As we observed in our previous studies (Kaluarachchi, Tsokos, & 
Rajasooriya, 2016), the effect of the vulnerabilities vary with the time through their life cycle. 
Therefore, for a particular system, the most threatening vulnerability (2016 U.S Government 
Cybersecurity report and NVD Data base) at time t1 might not be the same at time t2. Hence, it would 
be very useful to have analytical models to observe the behavior of the rank of vulnerabilities based on 
the magnitude of the threat with respect to time for a given network system.  
Such ranking distribution over time would empower the defenders by giving the priority directions to 
attend on fixing vulnerabilities. In this paper we attempt to address this need. 
 
2. Methodology  
2.1 Google Page Rank Algorithm 
This section provides a background for our quantitative analysis of Risk Rank Algorithm method. 
Ranking web pages is an important function of an internet search engine (Kijsanayothin, 2010; Sawilla, 
2007). Google Page Rank Algorithm (Gleich, 2015) is one of the most accurate and efficient page 
ranking methods in use. Methodology behind this algorithm will be briefly discussed below. 
Output of this algorithm gives a probability distribution which is used to represent the likelihood that a 
person randomly clicking on links will arrive at any particular page. Using this method we can rank the 
likelihood of clicking on any web link. This can be calculated for any number of web links. In this 
algorithm, the sum of the page rank values of all the considered web links is equal to be one and it is 
assumed that the probability of selecting a web page initially is equal for any available option. 
Google page rank algorithm simulates the clicking behavior of a web link in two ways. First is to visit a 
web link via an incoming link to the current web page and second way is to pick a web page randomly. 
Google page rank theory holds that an any surfer who is randomly clicking on web links will 
eventually stop clicking. At any of these stages, a damping factor d is the probability that the web 
surfer will continue surfing. Many researchers have tested various damping factors but in generally it is 
assumed that the damping factor will be set around 0.85. 
Let ݌௧ሺݒሻ be the probability of visiting web page	ݒ at time t and ܸ be a set of all web pages under 
consideration. Here ݋ݑݐሺݒሻ represents the set of web pages in ݒ with an outgoing link from ݒ, and 
݅݊ሺݒሻ represents the set of incoming link to ݒ. The page rank computation can be viewed as a Markov 
process whose states are pages and the links between pages represent state transitions (Kijsanayothin, 
2010). This computation is given in the Equation (1) below. 
௧ܲାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݀ሻ ∗ 	∑ ௉೟ሺ௨ሻ|௏|∀௨∈௏ ൅ ݀ ∗	∑
௉೟ሺ௨ሻ
|௢௨௧ሺ௨ሻ|∀௨∈௜௡ሺ௩ሻ 																																																							(1) 
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Let,	|ܸ|	be the number of pages considered. Surfer will stop clicking on any link with probability 1−d. 
Since there are |V| number of pages and probability of visiting ݒ from any page is equally likely, the 
probability for each case is equal to ଵ|௏|. 
Here ݀ ∗	∑ ௉೟ሺ௨ሻ|௢௨௧ሺ௨ሻ|∀௨∈௜௡ሺ௩ሻ 		 represents the case when the surfer continues clicking links with 
probability d and goes to page ݒ at time t + 1 from page u that has an incoming link to ݒ. 
Initially at t = 0, each page has the same ranking value probability which is equal to ଵ|௏|. Then iterations 
are executed over time until the stability is achieved. Once the probability distribution for each page 
becomes stable, considering high to low probabilities ranks are assigned. 
 
3. Risk Rank Algorithm 
By developing the concept applied in Google Page Rank Algorithm here we introduce a ranking 
method for risk of vulnerabilities (Frei, 2009) in a network system. 
To estimate the probabilities in Risk Rank Algorithm Markov model techniques can be applied 
similarly as in Google Page Rank Algorithm (Gleich, 2015). However there is a difference between 
web surfing behavior and Cyber attacking behavior. A web surfing user can randomly select a web 
page but in cyberattacks an attacker doesn’t have the same freedom. In web surfing user can arrive at 
any web page in one single step by using it’s URL. But attacker has many restrictions. In computer 
net-work system an attacker doesn’t have the access to all vulnerabilities in the network system. To 
achieve attacker’s target state he must exploits several vulnerabilities in a particular order and enters in 
to the target system. 
In the attacking process an attacker has two options. He can either continue or quit from his current 
path. If it is too difficult for him to achieve his goal state he can quit on the current path and try an 
alternative path by starting over from one of the set of initial states. Base on these assumptions here we 
propose our model to calculate the probability distribution of a given security attack model. 
To obtain the risk rank (Alhazmi & Joh, n.d.) we used the risk factor R(v(t)) (Rajasooriya, n.d.) of each 
vulnerability at each state and calculated normalized risk factor matrix A(V, R) for the attack net-work 
system by using ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ transition probabilities from state u to v. Thus, we can calculate transition 
probabilities using the equation ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ = ோሺ௩ሺ௧ሻሻ∑ ோሺ௪ሺ௧ሻሻ∀ೢ∈೚ೠ೟ሺೠሻ  
Let Pk(v) be the probability of exploiting state ݒ at time k and V be a set of all states under 
consideration. Here ݋ݑݐሺݒሻ represents the set of states in V with an outgoing link from ݒ, and ݅݊ሺݒሻ 
represents the set of incoming link to ݒ. The Risk rank computation can be viewed as a Markov 
process (Lawler, 2006; Abraham, 2014) whose state are vulnerabilities and the links between 
vulnerabilities represent state transitions. This computation is given in the Equation (2) below. 
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௞ܲାଵሺݒሻ ൌ ൝ ݀ ∗ 	∑ ௞ܲሺݑሻ ∗ ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ ൅	
ሺଵିௗሻ
|ூ|∀௨∈௜௡ሺ௩ሻ 	,			݂݅	ݒ	݅ݏ	ܽ݊	݅݊ݐ݈݅ܽ	ݏݐܽݐ݁
݀ ∗ 	∑ ௞ܲሺݑሻ ∗ ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ∀௨∈௜௡ሺ௩ሻ ,																݂݅	ݒ	݅ݏ	݊݋ݐ	ܽ݊	݅݊ݐ݈݅ܽ	ݏݐܽݐ݁
																															
  (2) 
Let |I| be the number of initial states and attacker will stop his current path with probability 1−d. Since 
there are |V| number of states and probability of exploiting v from any other state is equally likely, the 
probability for each case is ଵ|௏|.  
Here in equation (2) ݀ ∗	∑ ௞ܲሺݑሻ ∗ ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ∀௨∈௜௡ሺ௩ሻ 	represents the case when the attacker continues his 
current path with probability d and attack to state v at time t+1 from state u that has an incoming link to 
vulnerability v. 
Initially at t=0 each state has the same ranking value which is equal to ଵ|௏|. Then computing iterations 
over time once the stability achieved. Once the probability distribution for each state become stable, 
assigning rank to each vulnerability (Noel et al., 2005; Mehta et al., 2006). 
 
Algorithm 1 Risk Rank Algorithm 
1: procedure Risk Rank Algorithm (Input) 
2: Determine the input values. 
3: A(V, R)= Probability transition matrix, V - Set of states in the attack graph,  R(v(t))-Risk factor of 
vulnerability v at time t, ߮(u, v)- transition probability from state u to v, I - Set of initial states. out(v) 
- Set of all states out going from state v, 
|V |- Number of states. 
4: begin each v∈V 
5: set ௢ܲሺݒሻ ൌ ଵ|௏| 
6: for ∀u∈out(v) do 
7: ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ= ோሺ௩ሺ௧ሻሻ∑ ோሺ௪ሺ௧ሻሻ∀ೢ∈೚ೠ೟ሺೠሻ  
8: end 
9: for k=k + 1 
10: ௞ܲାଵሺݒሻ ൌ ݀ ∗	∑ ௞ܲሺݑሻ ∗ ߮ሺݑ, ݒሻ∀௨∈௜௡ሺ௩ሻ  
11: if v∈I then 
12:        ௞ܲାଵሺݒሻ ൌ ௞ܲାଵሺݒሻ ൅ ሺଵିௗሻ|ூ|  
13: end if 
14: end for 
15: break if Pk+1(v)=Pk(v), ∀v ∈ V 
16:           end procedure 
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This procedure is illustrated by the following schematic network. 
 
 
Figure 1. Key Steps of the Risk Rank Algorithm 
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4. Illustration of Applying of the Risk Rank Algorithm 
To illustrate the proposed analytical approach model that we have developed as discussed above, we 
considered a Network Topology (Kaluarachchi et al., 2016), given by Figure 2, below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Network Topology 
 
The computer network consists of two service hosts IP 1, IP 2 and an attacker’s workstation. Attacker 
is connecting to each of the servers via a central router. In the server IP 1 the vulnerability is labeled as 
CVE 2016-3230 and shall be denoted as V1. In the server IP 2, there are two recognized vulnerabilities 
which are labeled as CVE 2016-2832 and CVE 2016-0911. Let’s denote them as V2 and V3, 
respectively. 
We proceed using the CVSS score [11], [12] of the above vulnerabilities in our analysis. 
The exploitability score (e(vj)) and Risk factor of each vulnerability are given in Table 1, below. 
 
Table 1. Vulnerability Scores 
Vulnerability Published date CVSS score e(vj ) (tj ) R(vj (t)) 
V1(CVE 2016-3230) 6/15/2016 9 (High) 8 9 1.702 
V2(CVE 2016-2832) 6/13/2016 4.3 (medium) 2.8 11 0.3667 
V3(CVE 2016-0911) 6/19/2016 1.9 (Low) 3.4 5 0.2474 
 
For example we can calculate the Risk Factor of V1 as follows. 
R(vj (t))=Y (t) × e(vj), 
R(v1(t))=[0.1917010.383521(1/t)−0.00358 ln(ln(t))] × 8, 
and 
R(v1(9))=1.702. 
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Although the method we propose can be applied to any form of network system, for simplicity we will 
use our host centric attack graph model (Kaluarachchi et al., 2016; Mehta et al., 2006) introduced 
below to illustrate the process. The host centric attack graph is shown by Figure 3, below. Here, we 
consider that the attacker can reach the goal state only by exploiting Vulnerability V3. The graph shows 
all the possible paths that is available for the attacker to reach the goal state. 
Note that IP 1, 1 state represents vulnerability V1 and states IP 2,1 and IP 2,2 represent vulnerabilities 
V2 and V3 respectively. The attacker can reach each state by exploiting the relevant Vulnerability. 
With this methodology for the Host Centric Attack graph (Wang et al., 2007), we can obtain the 
Adjacency Matrix as follows. Applying the information given in Table 1, the matrix A(V, R) is derived. 
The matrix the transition probabilities from one state to another state. 
 
 
Figure 3. Host Centric Attack Graph 
 
ܣ ൌ ቎
0 . 76
0 0
. 24 0
1 00 . 83
0 0
0 . 17
0 1
቏ 
Applying this normalized risk matrix into Algorithm 1, we can obtain steady state probabilities for each 
state in the network which represent risk of being exploited (Frei, 2009; Joh & Malaiya, 2010). Results 
we obtained for each state are shown in the Table 2. 
Table 2 results are in the order of being exploited by attacker at time t. Order of vulnerabilities based 
on the rank we obtained is s1, s2, s3, s0.  
 
Table 2. Ranking Results in Attack States 
States Rank probability Rank 
s0 0.15 
4 
s1 0.293669 1 
s2 0.279731 2 
s3 0.2766 3 
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This result suggests that s1 has the highest likelihood of being attacked. This means at time t, s1 is the 
most vulnerable state. However according to Table 1 risk factor values for vulnerability v1 is 1.702 
which is higher than the risk factor values of vulnerabilities v2 and v3. Therefore it is reasonable to 
assume that reaching state s1 from initial state s0 (attacker’s state) by exploiting v1 vulnerability is 
easier than reaching states s2 and s3. Therefore, the risk rank of the state s1 is higher than other states. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Works 
In this paper a new Ranking Algorithm was introduced to rank the vulnerabilities in a particular 
computer network system. The methodology of well-known Google Page Rank Algorithm (Gleich, 
2015) was used and we further developed it to fit a computer network environment. General 
assumptions used in Google Page Rank Algorithm with respect to the probability of selecting a 
particular web link were changed according to the probability distributions we obtained by normalized 
vulnerability scores in subject computer network system. Ranks were obtained for each vulnerability 
based on the likelihood of those vulnerabilities getting exploited (Rajasooriya, Tsokos, & Kaluarachchi, 
2016). This new methodology will greatly help relevant parties to make better decisions to protect 
network systems because at a particular network system, the algorithm will indicate which 
vulnerabilities are most vulnerable and needed immediate attention or priority.  
In future we are planning to develop the algorithm so that the Distribution of Ranks of Vulnerabilities 
in the subject computer network system is given as a function of time. That is, using our new algorithm, 
a user (a network system administrator or a researcher) would be able to observe the behavior of the 
ranks of vulnerabilities with respect to time.  
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